



Security Council

Expert report on the topic: UN Army and Peacekeeping Forces. Implementation of the Charter Provisions (Articles 43-47)

The report is devoted to the comparative analysis of two UN approaches to international security – regular armed forces concept stipulated by Articles 43-47 of the Charter, and peacekeeping forces experience.

The report considers historical background, legal basis, and reasons for non-implementation of the UN armed forces project, and analyzes the principles, mandates, and peacekeeping missions' limitations as well as their role in the modern world order. The report highlights the issues of peacekeeping efficiency, including political dependence, limited resources, and ambiguous powers.

The report identifies strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches and determines the necessity to change the peacekeeping strategy.

Contents

1. Main aspects of the issue	3
2. Historical overview: from the Military Staff Committee to the modern peacekeepers.....	4
3. Status and legal basis.....	6
<i>A. Legal basis for the UN armed forces establishment.....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>B. Role of the Military Staff Committee.....</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>C. Legal basis for peacekeeping forces.....</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>D. Legal bases comparative analysis.....</i>	<i>9</i>
4. Aspects of activities	10
5. Peacekeeping activities problematics	12
6. Conclusion.....	14
7. References	17

1. Main Aspects of the Issue.

The UN armed forces and peacekeepers are among key issues of international law and collective security practice. The discussion focuses on the UN Charter, particularly Articles 43–47 that stipulate establishment of permanent military forces under control of the Security Council. Original idea implied that the mentioned armed forces would maintain constant readiness, have unified command and respond rapidly to acts of aggression, breaches of the peace or threats to international stability. However, due to political differences between the permanent members of the Security Council, especially during the Cold War, the mechanism has not been implemented. No special agreements mentioned in Article 47 have been concluded, and the Military Staff Committee established by Article 47 remains primarily an advisory body.

The absence of permanent UN army led to development of an alternative mechanism – peacekeeping forces. In contrast with armed forces, peacekeeping forces are not mentioned in the Charter, but were established on the basis of the Resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The first peacekeeping missions were initiated in the late 1940s with the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO, 1948). Over the years, peacebuilding activities got an institutional form with the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1992) and other structures coordinating *Blue Helmets'* activities. Peacekeeping forces shall consist of national contingents provided on a voluntary basis, act on the basis of mandates which determine their strength, objectives, and rules of engagement. Core peacekeeping principles are the consent of the host party, impartiality, and non-use of the force except in self-defense or defense of the mission's mandate.

Comparative analysis between the UN armed forces and peacekeeping forces reveals that despite similar goal to ensure international peace and security their legal bases, structures and mechanisms differ. The UN armed forces were designed as an enforcement tool entitled to operate by the decision of the Security Council without the consent of the parties to a conflict in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. Peacekeeping forces, on the other hand, operate with the consent of all the parties to a conflict and have limited mandates that make them more flexible, but less powerful response tool.

As evidenced in practice, peacebuilding has become the main UN tool in the context of impossibility to establish permanent armed forces. Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations efficiency often depends on the political will of donor states, mandates quality and resources available. The UN history witnessed examples of successful missions (Sierra Leone, Liberia), as well as peacekeepers' failures to prevent humanitarian catastrophes (Rwanda, Srebrenica). There are also systemic problems: underfunding, lack of equipment, poor coordination, cases of human rights abuse committed by staff. These factors constitute a complex of challenges that require changing the approach to peacekeeping.

Therefore, the main problem is that the mechanism for armed forces establishment formally stipulated in the UN Charter was never implemented, and the common practice of peacekeeping has both advantages and serious limitations. This situation brings up the question on the ways to increase the UN's efficiency in peacebuilding: through the

Military Staff Committee reform, permanent forces establishment, peacekeeping missions' improvement, or through the combination of these ways. Analysis of historical, legal, and organizational aspects of the issue enables better understanding of the reasons for the UN Charter original ideas transformation into the modern model.

2. Historical Overview: from the Military Staff Committee to the Modern Peacekeepers.

The Military Staff Committee is a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council specified in the UN Charter (Article 47).

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) role is "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament".

In accordance with Article 47, the MSC shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council: China, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France. Responsibility is delegated to the Heads of Military Delegations (P-5 Military Advisers). Each delegation has a representative from each of the three Armed Services.

The UN, including its permanent members, should have held their national military forces contingents immediately available and placed at disposal of the MSC in case of necessity. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in the abovementioned agreements. These provisions laid down the legal basis for development of the UN unified armed forces.

It was the MSC and the unified armed forces at its disposal that should have become a key mechanism to ensure efficiency of decisions taken to use military force against aggressors and to apply other coercive tools when other means (sanctions, rupture of relations, etc.) proved to be insufficient.

All the issues related to the Armed Forces of the United Nations (UN AF) shall be settled in compliance with the rule of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. The history of the UN AF application witnessed multiple violations of the UN Charter. No special agreements indicated in Article 43 of the Charter were concluded, the Military Staff Committee remains almost inactive, armed forces organization and command lies in hands of the Secretary General of the UN.

Over the past eight decades, the role and functions of the Military Staff Committee (MSC), as stipulated in the UN Charter, have adapted to the evolving realities of the United Nations system, which has undergone substantial changes since 1946. Since its inception in 1945, the Military Staff Committee has not been fully operational, thereby rendering the establishment of UN armed forces, as envisaged by the Charter, impossible. Throughout the entire history of the UN and the MSC, only

two operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter have been conducted: the 1950 Korean War operation and Desert Storm operation in 1991. All other operations aimed at maintaining international peace and security have been, and continue to be, carried out by UN peacekeeping forces. The existence of UN peacekeeping forces, *Blue Helmets*, is not stipulated in the United Nations Charter. While peacekeeping forces exist de facto, they are de jure absent from the Charter. Peacekeeping forces were established by the Resolution of the UN General Assembly, effectively filling the void left by the non-realization of the permanent UN armed forces envisioned under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The dynamics of the Cold War, the confrontation between power blocs, and the early abandonment of establishing autonomous, permanent UN armed forces prevented the Military Staff Committee (MSC) from fulfilling its intended role, which is to function as the UN's global defense department. The organization and activities related to UN peacekeeping operations, a sphere of activity not explicitly stipulated in the UN Charter, evolved as the UN Secretariat appealed to all member states for military contingents to implement mandates established by the Security Council. The first such mission was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), established in 1948. In 1992, the Secretariat established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to "provide political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations and to maintain contact with the Security Council, troop- and financial-contributing countries, and parties to conflicts in implementing Security Council mandates." The creation of the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the work of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) further amplified the UN Secretariat's role in implementing the security-related elements of the Council's mandates. Thus, the UN Secretariat, rather than the MSC, became the central body for managing the Organization's military activities. In this evolutionary process, the MSC was left with only a consultative function in relation to the work of the Security Council.

Despite the initial ambitions of the UN Charter, which aimed to create an effective mechanism for collective security under the leadership of the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the realities of the Cold War and the lack of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council led to its de facto inaction. Instead of unified UN armed forces subordinate to the MSC, the peacekeeping system evolved through ad hoc missions managed by the Secretariat. This reflected a transition from coercive measures to a more flexible operational format, based on the voluntary participation of states and the consent of the conflicting parties. Consequently, the MSC retained only consultative functions, while the actual leadership of peacekeeping operations transferred to UN Departments. This evolution demonstrates that mechanisms for maintaining international peace are compelled to adapt to political realities, even at the expense of their original designs. However, the question of the necessity for reforming the UN's military-political instruments, including the potential of the MSC, remains pertinent amidst new global challenges.

3. Status and Legal Basis.

The legal status of employing armed forces within the framework of the United Nations (UN) is one of the key aspects of international law concerning the maintenance of peace and security. At the core of this system lies the UN Charter, which, in several of its provisions, establishes mechanisms for a collective response to threats to peace, acts of aggression, and breaches of international order. Articles 43–47 hold a particular significance in this context, outlining the procedures for the formation and deployment of armed forces that member states commit to placing at the disposal of the Security Council. Despite the detailed provisions of the Charter, their practical implementation proved impossible due to political and organizational reasons.

Concurrently, starting from the late 1940s, a distinct mechanism emerged within UN operations: peacekeeping operations, which are formed based on resolutions of the Security Council or the General Assembly. These forces, unlike the permanent UN army, do not have direct stipulation in the Charter, yet they have become the primary tool for ensuring international peace. An examination of the legal framework for both models, the Charter-based army and peacekeeping forces, allows for an understanding of the distinctions between theoretical concept and established practice.

Legal Basis for the Creation of UN Armed Forces

Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for a mechanism whereby member states make armed forces available to the Security Council for operations aimed at maintaining or restoring international peace and security. These provisions are binding and constitute norms of primary UN law.

Article 43 stipulates that all Members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the strength and types of forces, their degree of readiness, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. These agreements shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44 establishes that when the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces. This provision reflects the principle of participation in decision-making for states bearing responsibility for the execution of military operations.

Article 45 prescribes that, in order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action.

Article 46 states that plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (MSC).

Article 47 is dedicated to the MSC, which shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, and functions to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements. It shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

Despite the explicit Charter provisions, the special agreements envisaged in Articles 43–47 were never concluded. It was initially planned that their signing would occur within the first year after the Charter's entry into force (1945); however, due to the onset of the Cold War and deep political disagreements among the permanent members of the Security Council, this process was suspended. Thus, the permanent UN army, conceived as a centralized and perpetually ready military instrument, remained an unrealized concept.

Role of the Military Staff Committee

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) was established in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter and was intended to be the central body for the strategic command of a UN army. It comprises the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. The primary tasks of the MSC include:

- Advising the Security Council on all military matters;
- Developing plans for the use of armed force;
- Directing armed forces placed at the disposal of the UN;
- Coordinating questions of disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

However, the actual role of the MSC has proven to be minimal. In the absence of a permanent UN army, the Committee lost its central importance and today functions more as a formal advisory body. MSC meetings are held infrequently, and their agenda is limited to matters of military expertise concerning specific UN operations.

Legal Basis for Peacekeeping Forces

Peacekeeping forces, unlike the Charter-envisioned army, are not directly provided for in the text of the UN Charter. Their legal basis evolved gradually, in response to specific crisis situations, and includes:

General provisions of the Charter — Article 1 (Purposes of the United Nations), Article 24 (Functions and Powers of the Security Council), and Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes") provides for diplomatic measures, while Chapter VII ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression") allows the Security Council to employ measures, including military ones, for the restoration of peace.

Security Council Decisions — each peacekeeping operation is established by a separate resolution, which specifies the mandate, tasks, strength and composition of contingents, and rules of engagement. Examples include Resolution 143 (1960), which established the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), or Resolution 1244 (1999), which established the international presence in Kosovo.

General Assembly Resolution 377(V) *Uniting for Peace* (1950) — provides for the possibility of recommending collective measures, including the deployment of armed forces, if the Security Council is unable to act due to disagreements among its permanent members.

Principles of peacekeeping — consent of the host country, impartiality, and non-use of force except in cases of self-defense or defense of the mandate. These principles were first formulated during the creation of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 and were enshrined in the *Capstone Doctrine* (2008).

Legal Bases Comparative Analysis

The legal frameworks of a UN armed and peacekeeping forces differ in their origin, legal force, and implementation mechanisms.

UN armed forces:

- Direct Charter enshrinement (Articles 43-47);
- Mandatory creation for member states upon conclusion of special agreements;
- Constant readiness and centralized command via the Military Staff Committee;
- Highest status legal basis within the hierarchy of international law sources.

Peacekeeping forces:

- No direct Charter enshrinement, but reliance on general provisions and UN agency decisions;
- Voluntary formation from national contingents;
- Time- and task-limited mandate, defined by a resolution; - flexible legal basis allowing for operational adaptation.

Thus, the UN's charter-based armed forces remained a concept due to the political impossibility of its implementation, while peacekeeping forces have become the de facto tool for the use of military force within the UN's collective security system.

4.Aspects of Activities.

Understanding the differences between the UN armed forces — a legally prescribed but unrealized instrument — and the actually functioning peacekeeping missions enables a more accurate assessment of the UN's potential and limitations in the realm of international security.

Although the functional capacity of the UN armed forces, as a standing armed force, has not been realized in practice, it represents a significant theoretical component of international security. In accordance with Article 43 of the UN Charter, member states are obliged, by agreement with the Security Council, to make available armed forces, facilities, and infrastructure to implement the Council's decisions on peace maintenance. These forces were intended to be on permanent standby, capable of rapid intervention in conflicts, and acting in the interests of collective security. Thus, the UN armed forces were conceived as an international military tool capable of rapid deployment, possessing unified command, and

equipped with its own intelligence, communication, and logistical resources. However, throughout the UN's history, the concept of a regular army has been consistently hindered by the absence of political consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council. Contradictions were particularly acute during the Cold War, when the creation of an international armed force was automatically perceived as a threat to national sovereignty and strategic balance.

Nevertheless, on several occasions, they resorted to so-called *coercive measures* where the Security Council mandated coalitions of states to conduct military operations on behalf of the international community. A prime example is the Korean War (1950–1953), during which forces under the command of the United States operated on the basis of the Security Council Resolution adopted in the absence of the USSR. Similar actions were carried out in other regions – for example, in Iraq (1991) or Libya (2011), where Security Council Resolutions authorized the use of force to restore peace.

Consequently, despite the absence of the UN armed forces as an institutional entity, its functions were partially implemented through coalition mechanisms. However, such operations were characterized by high politicization, dependence on the military power of individual states, and often drew criticism for violating the principle of collectivity in decision-making.

Unlike the UN armed forces, peacekeeping missions serve as a consistently functioning instrument for the UN in the realm of security. The Department of Peace Operations (DPO), whose activities are regulated by the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, manages their organization and coordination. Peacekeeping forces are formed on a voluntary basis from contingents of member states. The main task of peacekeepers is to stabilize situations in regions experiencing armed conflicts or in post-conflict phases. Their activities are aimed at preventing renewed violence, protecting civilians, facilitating elections, restoring state institutions, reforming the security sector and judicial system, and providing humanitarian assistance.

The mandates of peacekeeping missions are defined by the Security Council and can vary significantly in intensity. Some missions are limited to truce supervision (e.g., UNTSO), while others include elements of stabilization, reform, and civilian protection (e.g., MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or MINUSMA in Mali). Some modern operations allow for the use of force not only in self-defense but also to ensure compliance with the mandate, effectively expanding the functions of peacekeepers to elements of peace enforcement. However, unlike the armed forces, such actions require approval from the Security Council and depend on the political will of donor states. Additionally, peacekeepers do not possess heavy weaponry, aviation, or strategic capabilities that could provide an advantage in complex conflict conditions.

One of the key differences between the UN armed forces and peacekeepers lies in the nature of their interaction with conflicting parties. The armed forces, as a tool of coercion, implies intervention without the consent of the parties involved, based on Chapter VII of the Charter, with the aim of suppressing aggression. In contrast, peacekeepers typically

operate with the formal consent of all conflict participants and act as neutral mediators, thereby minimizing the risk of escalation. This approach, on the one hand, ensures the political acceptability of the UN's presence, but on the other hand, limits the effectiveness of missions if agreements are violated or if there is no genuine desire for reconciliation among the parties.

The following examples illustrate these differences. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the UNPROFOR peacekeepers were unable to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica because their mandate was limited to observation and did not allow for the use of force. Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone, the UNAMSIL mission, which had broader powers, managed to stabilize the situation and facilitate the disarmament of rebels. This highlights the critical dependence of peacekeeping effectiveness on the parameters of the mandate, political support, and resources. If the UN armed forces were established, it could potentially act more decisively; however, the political impossibility of its formation makes peacekeeping the primary, albeit limited, tool for UN intervention in conflicts.

Therefore, the operations of the UN armed forces and UN peacekeepers are conceptually distinct in terms of their functions, methods of force application, the nature of state involvement, and the extent of operational autonomy. The establishment of the UN armed forces remains a theoretical embodiment of the idea of collective security with a high degree of mobilization readiness and centralized command. Peacekeepers, in contrast, represent a flexible, adaptive, and politically acceptable format, relying on multilateral participation and consent. Their effectiveness depends on the nature of the conflict, the Security Council support, and the capabilities of contributing states. At present, it is peacekeeping that remains the primary form of fulfilling the UN's security mandate, despite its recognized limitations in highly conflictual environments and the lack of political will among the involved parties.

5. Peacekeeping Activities Problematics.

Despite the significant contributions of UN peacekeeping forces to stabilizing conflict regions, their operations are fraught with a number of systemic problems and limitations. These issues negatively affect the missions' efficiency and public trust in the organization itself. These problems are rooted in both institutional and operational aspects, covering the legal, political, logistical and ethical levels of functioning.

One of the key problems is the ambiguity of peacekeeping operations mandates – they are often formulated in a too vague manner and do not contain clear criteria for intervention and assessment of effectiveness. Such uncertainty creates a risk of ambiguous interpretation of tasks and leads to the passivity of peacekeepers in critical situations. The Srebrenica massacre is a classic example. In 1995, the Dutch peacekeeping contingent (as part of the UNPROFOR mission) was unable to prevent genocidal killing of 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the UN had declared a “safe zone” there. The peacekeepers had no clear authority for the use of force that made their intervention impossible even with the threat of mass genocide. A similar situation was in Rwanda in 1994. The UNAMIR mission had no sufficient

mandate and troops for preventing genocide of Tutsi, although the UN force commander Roméo Dallaire had warned the organization earlier.

The second significant limitation is the dependence of peacekeeping missions on the will of member states. The UN does not have its own armed forces so its response to the global incidents depends entirely on voluntary contributions of member states. Thus, it leads to unequal quality of contingents training, as well as delays of their deployment and equipment shortages. For example, in the MINUSMA mission in Mali, military personnel from various countries (including Bangladesh, Chad and Egypt) faced a lack of close air support and equipment shortages leaving them vulnerable to terrorist groups' attacks. Moreover, the political interests of troop-contributing States often conflict with the neutral nature of peacekeeping, undermining its legitimacy. It is especially evident in cases when the UN contingents do not respect the impartiality principle. For example, the peacekeepers were accused of supporting governmental forces during the UN mission in Ethiopia and South Sudan.

Another challenge is the lack of a unified command and insufficient coordination between the various structures. It causes difficulties in integration of tactics, standards, communication protocols and languages delaying making decisions and responsiveness of command. For example, the MONUSCO (former MONUC) mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo recorded a number of delays in responding to rebel attacks due to highly bureaucratized system and unclear coordination between military and humanitarian units.

The problem of discipline and responsibility of peacekeepers is of particular concern. In several cases, peacekeeping forces have been accused of committing serious human rights violations, including sexual exploitation, human trafficking, and abuse of civilians. The biggest scandal was in Haiti during the MINUSTAH mission when Nepalese peacekeepers caused a cholera epidemic killing 10,000 civilians. Moreover, the peacekeepers were accused of raping and sexual exploitation of juvenile during the UN missions in Haiti and the Central African Republic. At the same time, institutional prosecution mechanisms are often ineffective: personnel are under the jurisdiction of their country, not the UN, therefore their punishment is extremely rare. Subsequently, it undermines trust to peacekeeping and fosters a culture of impunity, especially in poor and vulnerable regions.

The issue of underfunding the UN peacekeeping missions is caused by several factors: irregular or incomplete contributions from sponsor states, budget reallocation in favor of countries' domestic priorities, competition for limited resources among coincident operations, as well as dependence on the political will of key sponsor states. Underfunding of the UN missions leads to reduction of peacekeeping contingent, limited use of modern military equipment, lower personnel training and ensuring safety of the missions. Thus, the mission is unable to fulfill its mandate properly. The main sponsor states are the UN members, primarily the United States, China, Japan, France and Germany, as well as such regional organizations as the European Union and the African Union. It is their financial decisions that determine the peacekeeping operations sustainability.

Another major issue is the limited nature of the peacekeepers' interaction with the local population. Lack of cultural response, language barrier, constant contingents' rotation and formal approach to the tasks often lead to alienation between the troops and the locals. Obviously, without trust and cooperation, the effectiveness of the missions decreases. The peacekeepers of the UNMIK in Kosovo and the UNIFIL in South Lebanon were regularly accused of holding off and poorly involving in the local social sphere, as well as not understanding the conflict's context.

To sum up, the issue of the UN peacekeeping forces is a complex one. Weak institutionalization, lack of effective accountability mechanisms, political dependence, limited mandates, and isolated cases of abuse cast doubt on the ability of the UN peacekeepers to ensure long-term security and sustainable peace. To increase effectiveness, the peacekeeping component needs to be reformed: strengthening mechanisms of legal responsibility, developing clear and realistic mandates, improving personnel training, providing technical and logistical resources, and actively involving local communities in the peace-building process. Without these measures, the UN missions risk remaining ineffective and sometimes harmful to the populations they are supposed to protect.

6. Conclusion.

In conclusion, the concept of regular armed forces in accordance with the UN Charter and the relevant experience of using peacekeeping forces are two fundamentally different approaches to ensuring international peace and security. Despite the common goal of preventing and resolving armed conflicts, their legal framework, operating mechanisms and political context differ significantly.

In 1945, the UN Armed Forces were intended to be regular well-trained military force under command of the Security Council ready to respond rapidly to threats to peace. Its formation supposed to be based on special agreements with the UN member states in accordance with Article 43 of the UN Charter. The UN Department of Peace Operations command the peacekeepers in accordance with Article 47. Such a structure would minimize dependence on the political will of individual countries and ensure unified command. In practice, however, political differences between the permanent members of the Security Council, especially during the Cold War, made the implementation of this idea impossible.

The absence of the UN regular armed forces has led to the development of peacekeeping operations as an alternative mechanism. These forces are not mentioned directly in the Charter, but their legal basis was developed in the course of the UN's activities and enshrined in the Resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Peacekeeping has become a flexible instrument that allows it to act with the consent of the parties of a conflict, adapt to specific political conditions and play a mediating role in resolving disputes. However, limited mandates, reliance on voluntary contributions from member states and a prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense make such missions less effective in harsh conflicts.

Comparing these two models allows us to highlight their strengths and weaknesses. The UN Armed Forces potentially provides high response speed, independence from national interests and a unified command

system, but requires significant limitations on state sovereignty and the consent of all key players. In contrast, peacekeeping forces have greater political flexibility and acceptability among states, but often face resource shortages, ambiguous mandates, and limited ability to prevent conflicts from escalating.

In the context of modern challenges from interstate wars to hybrid conflicts, terrorism and humanitarian crises, the UN faces a choice: return to the idea of creating regular armed forces, reform peacekeeping operations or seek combined solutions. A possible solution could be the formation of rapidly responding multinational units under the UN command that would have clearly defined mandates and the resources necessary to carry out their tasks effectively.

The final choice will depend not only on legal and organizational factors, but also on the political will of member states, the willingness to compromise in the Security Council, and the ability of the UN to adapt to a rapidly changing international environment. Regardless of the form of implementation, the main goal remains unchanged – to ensure sustainable peace, prevent conflicts and protect human rights throughout the world.

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